The United States Government Accountability Office Urges Coast Guard Action on Vessel Response Plans for Marine Fires, Hazardous Substances, and Alternative Fuels
October 9, 2026
Types : Alerts
Congress recently instructed the United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), the audit arm of the federal government, to review the state of marine firefighting utilizing land-based firefighters, along with certain related subjects.
On September 29, 2026, the GAO released its report entitled “Coast Guard: Additional Action Needed to Address Marine Firefighting Challenges.”
Two of the GAO’s recommendations should be of interest to the ship owning and operating community.
The first has to do with timely activation of the vessel response plan after a casualty. The second covers issuance of regulations under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA 90”) mandating that owners and operators of tank vessels have vessel response plans addressing the discharge of hazardous substances.
The Coast Guard has accepted these recommendations, so industry can expect implementation in the foreseeable future.
In order to obtain the data on which its recommendations were based, GAO representatives visited various sites and interviewed local Coast Guard officials, municipal fire department officials, and maritime stakeholders regarding coordination, training, and response to nearshore fires. “Nearshore” for purposes of this report has been defined “as waters that are within three nautical miles from the shoreline, inland rivers, and the U.S. waters of the Great Lakes.” This definition includes fires on board the Grande Costa d’Avorio, the Hoegh Xiamen, and the Kodiak Enterprise, all of which were moored alongside a pier at the time each suffered a serious fire.
Activation
On this issue, the GAO made the following recommendation:
“The Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop and distribute information to maritime stakeholders and Coast Guard sectors on factors to consider when determining whether vessel response plans should be activated for marine fires. For example, the Coast Guard could compile examples of when vessel response plans were appropriately activated, or identify factors to consider in deciding when to activate vessel response plans based on prior marine fires.”
Because the mandate had to do with shipboard fires, the foregoing recommendation explicitly related to the response to such events, but in practice, any regulation that may be issued should apply to all situations.
Timely activation has been an issue commanding considerable attention, particularly from the salvage community, for a long time. The report cited the concern raised by a member of the salvage community that the “wait-and-see approach,” where a plan is not activated until the situation has deteriorated, endangers firefighters. Both the Grande Costa d’Avorio and the Hoegh Xiamen were cited as examples of the foregoing. In the former incident, two municipal firefighters perished, and in the latter, six were seriously injured, although it is not at all clear that early activation would have made a difference in the ultimate outcome of these two matters. The GAO report does not mention the Kodiak Enterprise incident, where the plan was promptly activated and an incident command established, but the recommendations of the salvor were ignored, leading to the total loss of the vessel, according to litigation the ship owner recently commenced against the municipal fire department.
The GAO report notes that the only guidance the Coast Guard has given states that the vessel response plan must be activated when the master determines the resources available on board are insufficient to meet the demands of the incident.
The report did note that both Coast Guard and shipowners’ representatives told the investigators that the existing guidance was inadequate. This information apparently led to the suggestion that the Coast Guard look for specific examples regarding activation.
Perhaps most importantly, however, the report disclosed that the Coast Guard is already in the process of developing “an administrative template to support captains of the port in directing vessel representatives to activate VRPs [vessel response plans].” Apparently, at some point, Incident Commanders may have criteria guiding any decision requiring activation where the ship owner has declined to take such steps. However, one could argue that drawing broad conclusions from idiosyncratic evidence is an uncertain business at best.
But the report is silent on two important points that will arise if the Coast Guard considers giving the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (“FOSC”) authority to force plan activation.
The problem as presented is “prompt” activation. Leaving that to the FOSC seems unlikely to accelerate the process, given that the matter has to be brought to that person after the passage of time during which those concerned are waiting for the vessel owner to act. Then the FOSC will need to consider the criteria for taking such action, and only after concluding that the standards for action have been met will the necessary order be issued to the vessel interests. This process seems contrary to the perceived need for “prompt” action.
Finally, OPA 90 already empowers the FOSC to federalize the response when the vessel interests do not or cannot respond adequately. This existing authority calls into question the need for any further Coast Guard action regarding activation.
Vessel Response Plans and Hazardous Substances
The GAO also recommended that the Coast Guard issue regulations requiring tank vessels carrying “hazardous substances,“ a defined term under OPA 90, to prepare and have in place vessel response plans addressing these materials. Current requirements for such documents cover only vessels carrying oil and using oil as bunkers. Also, it is not clear why the recommendation covers only “tank vessels.” Finally, the report omits any discussion regarding this recommendation.
Alternative Fuels
The report concludes with the recommendation that Congress consider amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act so that owners of non-tank vessels using alternative fuels have in place vessel response plans addressing discharge of such materials. It is not clear why tankers are excluded from this recommendation. Again, there is no discussion about the recommendation.
Alternative fuels present a major frontier for the shipping industry. As vessels using such fuels are coming into service, the risks these fuels pose are attracting considerable attention.
To this end, the OPA 90 Forum (of which the author is a founding member, director, and legal counsel) has just submitted to the Coast Guard a proposal for legislation along the lines the GAO has suggested. Of course, it remains to be seen how the Coast Guard reacts to the GAO recommendation, much less the Forum’s suggested statutory solution.
Questions about this alert? Contact Alfred Kuffler.